CacheAudit is a versatile framework for the automatic, static analysis of cache side channels. CacheAudit takes as input a program binary and a cache configuration, and it derives formal, quantitative security guarantees for a comprehensive set of side-channel adversaries, namely those based on observing cache states, traces of hits and misses, and execution times.
Keywords for this software
References in zbMATH (referenced in 7 articles )
Showing results 1 to 7 of 7.
- Ene, Cristian; Mounier, Laurent; Potet, Marie-Laure: Output-sensitive information flow analysis (2021)
- Barthe, Gilles; Betarte, Gustavo; Campo, Juan Diego; Luna, Carlos; Pichardie, David: System-level non-interference of constant-time cryptography. II: Verified static analysis and stealth memory (2020)
- André, Étienne; Sun, Jun: Parametric timed model checking for guaranteeing timed opacity (2019)
- Cañones, Pablo; Köpf, Boris; Reineke, Jan: On the incomparability of cache algorithms in terms of timing leakage (2019)
- Nemati, Hamed; Baumann, Christoph; Guanciale, Roberto; Dam, Mads: Formal verification of integrity-preserving countermeasures against cache storage side-channels (2018)
- Reineke, Jan; Salinger, Alejandro: On the smoothness of paging algorithms (2018)
- Cañones, Pablo; Köpf, Boris; Reineke, Jan: Security analysis of cache replacement policies (2017)